refactor(build): reformat code and add tonic health dependency

- Reformatted build script with proper indentation and line breaks
- Added tonic-health dependency to Cargo.toml and updated lock file
- Improved error handling in disk cache with concurrent deletion checks
- Refactored conditional chains using && and let expressions
- Reformatted struct initialization and function parameter lists
- Added proper spacing and alignment in language stats processing
- Improved assertion formatting in test cases
- Reorganized import statements and code layout in multiple files
- Updated metrics functions with better parameter handling and formatting

hooks/sanitize.rs

@@ -26,33 +26,33 @@ const FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
     "poweroff",
     "halt",
     // Additional patterns to catch encoding/obfuscation attempts
-    "eval ",           // eval can execute arbitrary strings
-    "exec ",           // exec can replace process
-    "$(",              // command substitution
-    "`",               // backtick command substitution
-    "${",              // variable expansion (can be used for obfuscation)
-    "|bash",           // piping to bash
-    "|sh",             // piping to sh
-    "|dash",           // piping to dash
-    "|zsh",            // piping to zsh
-    "base64",          // base64 encoding/decoding (common for obfuscation)
-    "python -c",       // inline python execution
-    "perl -e",         // inline perl execution
-    "ruby -e",         // inline ruby execution
-    "node -e",         // inline node execution
-    "/dev/tcp",        // bash reverse shell
-    "nc -e",           // netcat reverse shell
-    "ncat",            // netcat alternative
-    "socat",           // socket relay
+    "eval ",     // eval can execute arbitrary strings
+    "exec ",     // exec can replace process
+    "$(",        // command substitution
+    "`",         // backtick command substitution
+    "${",        // variable expansion (can be used for obfuscation)
+    "|bash",     // piping to bash
+    "|sh",       // piping to sh
+    "|dash",     // piping to dash
+    "|zsh",      // piping to zsh
+    "base64",    // base64 encoding/decoding (common for obfuscation)
+    "python -c", // inline python execution
+    "perl -e",   // inline perl execution
+    "ruby -e",   // inline ruby execution
+    "node -e",   // inline node execution
+    "/dev/tcp",  // bash reverse shell
+    "nc -e",     // netcat reverse shell
+    "ncat",      // netcat alternative
+    "socat",     // socket relay
 ];
 
 /// Additional regex-like patterns that indicate dangerous constructs.
 /// These are checked with simple string matching for complexity reasons.
 const DANGEROUS_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
-    "rm -rf /",        // rm -rf with absolute path
-    "rm -rf ~",        // rm -rf with home directory
-    "rm -rf .",        // rm -rf with relative path (current dir)
-    "rm -rf *",        // rm -rf with wildcard
+    "rm -rf /", // rm -rf with absolute path
+    "rm -rf ~", // rm -rf with home directory
+    "rm -rf .", // rm -rf with relative path (current dir)
+    "rm -rf *", // rm -rf with wildcard
 ];
 
 /// Maximum hook script size (64KB).
@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ pub fn validate_hook_content(content: &str) -> GitResult<()> {
 /// Check for common obfuscation attempts.
 fn check_obfuscation_attempts(content: &str) -> GitResult<()> {
     // Check for excessive use of special characters that might indicate obfuscation
-    let special_char_count = content.chars().filter(|c| matches!(c, '$' | '`' | '\\' | '|' | ';' | '&' | '(' | ')' | '{' | '}' | '[' | ']')).count();
+    let special_char_count = content
+        .chars()
+        .filter(|c| {
+            matches!(
+                c,
+                '$' | '`' | '\\' | '|' | ';' | '&' | '(' | ')' | '{' | '}' | '[' | ']'
+            )
+        })
+        .count();
     let total_chars = content.chars().count();
 
     // If more than 30% of content is special characters, it's suspicious